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Exogenous Cost Allocation in Peer-to-Peer
Electricity Markets
T. Baroche, P. Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE, R. Le Goff Latimier, H. Ben Ahmed
Abstract—The deployment of distributed energy resources,
combined with a more proactive demand side management, is
inducing a new paradigm in power system operation and elec-
tricity markets. Within a consumer-centric market framework,
peer-to-peer approaches have gained substantial interest. Peer-
to-peer markets rely on multi-bilateral negotiation among all
agents to match supply and demand. These markets can yield
a complete mapping of exchanges onto the grid, hence allowing
to rethink the sharing of costs related to the use of common
infrastructure and services. We propose here to attribute such
costs through exogenous network charges in several alternative
ways i.e. uniformly, based on the electrical distance between
agents and by zones. This variety covers the main grid physical
and regulatory configurations. Since attribution mechanisms are
defined in an exogenous manner to affect each P2P trade, they
eventually shift the market issue to cover the grid exploitation
costs. It can even be used to release the stress on the grid when
necessary. The interest of our approach is illustrated on a test
case using the IEEE 39 bus test system, underlying the impact
of attribution mechanisms on trades and grid usage.
Index Terms—Economic dispatch, Distributed optimization,
Optimal power flow, Cost allocation.
NOMENCLATURE
Λ Matrix of trade prices λnm of agent n with agent m
·T Matrix transpose operator
γnm Network charges of agent n’s trade with agent m
L Set of lines in the power system
N Set of nodes in the power system
| · | Absolute value operator
Ω Peer-to-peer market community of NΩ agents
Ωc Set of consumers (subset of Ω)
Ωg Set of generators (subset of Ω)
Ωp Set of prosumers (subset of Ω)
ωn Set of partners of agent n
P Matrix of trade powers pnm of agent n with agent m
θi Voltage angle at node i
pn/pn Lower/upper power boundary of agent n
dnm Electrical distance between agent n and agent m
fn Cost function of agent n
N zonenm Number of zones between agent n and agent m
pn Total amount of power traded by agent n
u Network fee of cost allocation policy
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I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed energy resources, jointly with ICT and energy
system management for residential homes and buildings, are
making us rethink our approach to power system operation.
Especially, going down to lower levels of the network, new
type of agents are appearing, namely prosumers, with the
ability to produce and consume (and most likely store in a
very near future). While substantial efforts are made to have
power system operation evolve in view of that new context,
electricity markets have not gone yet through the same process
of accommodating this new context with its challenges and
opportunities. Electricity markets are expected to go from
producer-centric to consumer-centric [1], [2], while they will
most likely include a peer-to-peer (P2P) and community-
based component [3]. A P2P market relies on multi-bilateral
direct trades among participants. Employing a P2P market
framework could yield a number of advantages, for instance
thanks to product preference and its consumer-centric nature,
allowing for a wealth of new business models.
Product preference is to be understood here as the fact that
market players can express preferences on the type and quality
of the energy they will exchange. Such preferences could
be for local energy generation, for energy with limited CO2
emissions, etc. However, there may be discrepancies between
market-clearing (and related dispatch) and feasible dispatch in
view of grid-related and operational constraints. In parallel,
while it appears normal to socialize grid-related costs in the
current wholesale-retail market structure, a future with peer-
to-peer exchange and preferences may allow to rethink the
way we attribute such costs. Our objective here is hence to
describe a consumer-centric market allowing to allocate grid-
related costs in an exogenous manner. Grid related costs may
refer to network investment cost as well as operating costs
such as maintenance, power losses, etc.
The various attribution mechanisms are to impact trades and
subsequent network usage. The first approach to coordinated
multi-lateral electricity trades was already proposed nearly
20 years ago [4]. The original aim was to allow for the
separation of economics and reliability of system operation, as
is the case for current European pool-based electricity markets.
The proposal involved an iterative process with all players
proposing their trades first, followed by the system operator
to decide whether the trades respect operational constraints, or
not. This proposal was recently enhanced in [5], also analyzing
game-theoretical properties of the solutions obtained. In both
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cases, the authors pointed at the fact that charges for network
usage were not considered.
A second approach may consist in relying on optimal power
flow (OPF) models, allowing to consider network constraints
in an endogenous manner (see e.g. [6]). While those are
traditionally solved in a centralized fashion, many decompo-
sition techniques were proposed to solve them in a distributed
fashion. Based on approximate Newton directions [7] proposed
a decentralized method to solve optimal power flow control
for power systems with overlapping areas. [8] followed by [9]
respectively proposed distributed state estimation and multi-
agent coordination in micro-grids based on consensus and
innovation approach. Concurrently [10] used the alternating
direction method of multipliers (ADMM), developed by [11],
to solve optimal power flow in a distributed manner. [12]
did the same with another consensus-based mechanism and
applied it to energy management of cooperative micro-grids
with P2P energy sharing in [13]. A comparison of different
distributed and decentralized algorithms was finally made in
[14]. More recently, works like that of [15] proposed to
account for network limits in the presence of distributed
renewable resources and using decentralized consensus on
a blockchain. Even though those operational problems are
increasingly considered in decentralized manner, these do not
comprise a market construct while they do not account for
how grid-related usage costs would be attributed.
In network-constrained economic dispatch problems, e.g.
[16], nodal prices classically encompasses both energy gen-
eration and congestion-related costs. Hence, grid costs to be
recovered are only related to congestion and network usage. In
contrast, the bilateral contracts considered here have a compo-
nent that is based on energy generation costs, supplemented by
a network charge component. This network charge component
is not only to recover all network costs but also other costs
e.g. operational, taxes and policy-related costs. Hence, network
constraints are not forced directly but rather accommodated
through these network charges. Another important benefit of
this approach is that market participants have knowledge of
network charges prior to the negotiation process. Contrary to
a classical economic dispatch, this transparency on network
charges enables agents to anticipate on what it will cost them
to trade on the network. The resulting P2P market formulation
comprises a simple tool, transparent to market participants,
for system and market operators to limit potential detrimental
effects that might be induced by P2P markets on power
networks. In this paper, costly incentives will be used to
allocate grid costs related to the P2P market. The strategy
to allocate costs, also called cost allocation policy, imposed to
the P2P market participants is chosen by the system operator.
The proposed cost allocation policies will be pondered by a
coefficient, named unit fee. The unit fee will give a degree of
freedom for the system operator to reach cost recovery.
The manuscript is structured as follows. Firstly, a novel P2P
market formulation allowing for product preference is pro-
posed in Section II. It is eventually solved in a decentralized
manner based on consensus ADMM. Subsequently, Section III
introduces three designs of network charges based on product
preference to influence the P2P market negotiation mechanism.
Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV
using a test case relying on the IEEE 39-bus system. Section
V gathers our conclusions and perspectives for further work.
II. P2P MARKET DESIGN AND CORRESPONDING
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
A P2P market is based on a community of agents with
flexible consumption or production. In this paper agents are
supposed rational as in [17], i.e. always objectively taking
the most beneficial decisions, and non-strategic, i.e. not an-
ticipating actions and reactions of other agents. The proposed
formulation will be compatible with the presence of prosumers
inside the community. Emphasis is eventually placed on a
deterministic clearing mechanism for a single market time
unit. It may readily be extended to multiple time units with
temporally binding constraints, while uncertainty could also
be considered in a scenario-based stochastic optimization
framework. First, a P2P market structure is described and
is, then, translated into a decentralized consensus ADMM
inspired from [11].
A. Problem Formulation
This paper aims at proposing an alternative way to treat the
following endogenous P2P economic dispatch
min
P,pn∈Ω,θi∈N
∑
n∈Ω fn (pn) (1a)
s.t. P = −PT (1b)
pn =
∑
m∈ωn pnm n ∈ Ω (1c)
pn 6 pn 6 pn n ∈ Ω (1d)
pnm > 0 n ∈ Ωg (1e)
pnm 6 0 n ∈ Ωc (1f)
pn 6 pnm 6 pn n ∈ Ωp (1g)
qij = Yij(θj − θi) 6 Cij (i, j) ∈ L (1h)∑
n∈Ni pn =
∑
(i,j)∈L qij i ∈ N (1i)
which straightly includes transmission network constraints,
as in [16], in the context of a P2P market. In transmission
networks, the admittance of electrical lines L, noted Yij for
the line connecting node i and j, are classically assumed to
be driven by their inductance in presence of pure sinusoidal
voltage and current. This assumption leads to real power flows
qij proportional to the difference of voltage angles, noted θi
at node i, between the two ends of the line as in (1h). To
avoid any damage to transmission lines their flows are bounded
by thermal limits Cij related to the heat they can dissipate.
Moreover, a power balance must be kept (1i) at each nodes N
of the grid between line flows and power injections of agents
connected to it, so in Ni at node i.
The goal of the P2P community Ω, of size NΩ, is to min-
imize the total cost which sums all individual cost functions
as in (1a). To minimize its cost function fn, agent n is able
to optimize its volume traded pn within a flexibility range
defined by a lower pn and an upper pn bound, as expressed
in (1d). Traded amount pn is taken positive if agent n is
selling electricity, and negative when buying. Considering
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multi-bilateral trades calls for a split of net powers, in the
manner of [18], into a set of multiple bilateral trades pnm.
Every possible bilateral power trades within the community
can be condensed in a matrix P such that
P =
 p11 · · · p1NΩ... . . . ...
pNΩ1 · · · pNΩNΩ
 (2)
where pnm is necessarily equal to zero if agent m is not
in agent n’s trading partnership set ωn. Net powers are then
obtained by pn =
∑
m∈ωn pnm as in (1c). As outlined in (1b),
P is skew-symmetric to insure power balance of each trade,
so pnn = 0. This allows to potentially individualize prices per
trade.
In this situation agents can buy a large amount of energy at
a low price from one agent to sell it back at a higher price to
another. This possibility of arbitraging can be proscribed by
limiting the possible amounts traded. Generators, for which
pn > 0 and grouped in Ωg , are forbidden to buy power in
(1e). On the other hand consumers, for which pn 6 0 and
grouped in Ωc, are forbidden to sell power in (1f). However,
prosumers, gathered in Ωp, must still be able to either buy
or sell power since they are such that pn < 0 < pn. Power
trades of prosumers are bounded by their power boundaries as
in (1g).
It is essential to notice that contrary to [16] dual variables
of nodal power balances (1i), noted ηi, do not include the
energy generation price but only prices to derive nodal energy
prices. Note that congestion rights originate from (1h)’s dual
variable. In our case, energy generation prices are given by the
dual variables for trade reciprocity (1b), denoted Λ = (λnm).
Directly coupling the P2P market to grid constraints as in
(1) implies an intense involvement of the system operator at
each step of the solving algorithm. To level this an exogenous
approach of the network limitations could be used. Network
constraints (1h)–(1i) can be condensed in a regularization
function h, equal to 0 if they are respected and +∞ if they
are violated. It can be noted that in this case h depends on the
real power injections pn∈Ω. Then, problem (1) can be written
as
min
P,pn∈Ω
∑
n∈Ω fn(pn) + h(pn∈Ω) (3a)
s.t. P = −PT (3b)
pn =
∑
m∈ωn pnm n ∈ Ω (3c)
pn 6 pn 6 pn n ∈ Ω (3d)
pnm > 0 n ∈ Ωg (3e)
pnm 6 0 n ∈ Ωc (3f)
pn 6 pnm 6 pn n ∈ Ωp. (3g)
However, even though (3) enables he system operator to
recover congestion related costs, it does not guarantee the
recovery of the costs of maintenance, modernization of power
lines, taxes, and policies. This paper proposes to replace
the regularization function h with exogenous terms. These
exogenous terms would aim not only at allocating congestion-
related costs but also costs of maintenance and modernization
of power lines, taxes, and policies such as e.g. renewable
support schemes. Preference prices as introduced in [18]
seems a good candidate for this purpose. Then, regularization
function h evaluating network constraints is be replaced by a
cost allocation function defined as
Γ(P) =
∑
n∈Ω γ
0
n +
∑
m∈ωn
γnmpnm (4)
where parameter γnm is the network charge associated to
power trade pnm for the given time step. Constant terms
γ0n, which do not affect the minimization outcome, allow
reflecting costs that are independent of the power traded,
such as power line investment and maintenance. Network
charges γnm, detailed in Section III, would then account for
congestion-related costs and taxes. Function Γ is separable
among participants, and will be integrated in their objective
function as it will be further discussed in Section III. Note
that Γ also represents the amount of money collected by the
system operator from community Ω for its use of the power
system.
In problem (3) with (4), reciprocity constraint (3b) is
the only barrier to fully distribute it. To overcome this an
additional slack variable W can be considered. Variable W,
which can contribute to reach consensus, aims at being the
image of all possible trades P. For this, reciprocity constraint
(3b) is replaced by power consensus constraint (5b) leading to
the deterministic, single time-step, exogenous P2P economic
dispatch
min
P,pn∈Ω,W
∑
n∈Ω
[
fn(pn) + γ
0
n +
∑
m∈ωn
γnmpnm
]
(5a)
s.t.
(
W−WT) /2 = P (5b)
pn =
∑
m∈ωn pnm n ∈ Ω (5c)
pn 6 pn 6 pn n ∈ Ω (5d)
pnm > 0 n ∈ Ωg (5e)
pnm 6 0 n ∈ Ωc (5f)
pn 6 pnm 6 pn n ∈ Ωp. (5g)
Note that the definition of partnership set ωn only inform on
agent n’s possible trades but does not enforce participation.
In other words, agent n keeps the possibility to opt-out of the
market, i.e. with outcome (pnm)m = 0, if its power boundaries
allow it. As proven in Appendix A, when no network charges
are applied, i.e. all γnm = 0, trading prices λnm are uniform
and equal to the pool market price. The system operator
does not intervene in solving (5) as it only provides network
charges γnm a priori. Hence, network charges are provided in
a transparent manner before negotiations such that agents can
anticipate on the over costs brought by the use of the power
system.
B. Decentralized P2P Market
As developed in Appendix B, a decentralized procedure
based on the consensus ADMM of [11] is used to solve
(5). This decentralized method solves global problem (5) and,
hence, leads to a competitive equilibrium which efficiency
strongly depends on the chosen network charges. According
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to [19] ADMM seems well adapted for negotiation mech-
anisms in smart grids. Several extensions and convergence
rate improvements have been proposed in [20]–[23]. Given
the focus of this paper is not on scalability a straightforward
implementation of consensus ADMM is used.
The final decentralized negotiation mechanism reads
P k+1n = argmin
Pn
fn(pn) + γ
0
n +
∑
m∈ωn
[
γnmpnm
+λknm
(
pknm−pkmn
2 − pnm
)
+(ρ/2)
(
pknm−pkmn
2 − pnm
)2 ]
s.t. pn =
∑
m∈ωn pnm
pn 6 pn 6 pn
pnm > 0 if n ∈ Ωg
pnm 6 0 if n ∈ Ωc
pn 6 pnm 6 pn if n ∈ Ωp
(6a)
λk+1nm = λ
k
nm − ρ
(
pk+1nm + p
k+1
mn
)
/2 (6b)
where penalty factor ρ > 0. Element λnm of matrix Λ
corresponds to generation price of electricity for traded volume
pnm. Possible trades of agents n can be grouped in vari-
able Pn = (pnm)m∈ωn . According to [11], supposing cost
functions fn to be closed, proper, and convex is a sufficient
condition to ensure convergence of (6). This formulation al-
lows to have primal feasibility of constraints (5c)–(5g) at each
iteration step. However, primal feasibility of trades reciprocity
(5b) is only verified at the limit after convergence. Note that
the additional terms of the augmented Lagrangian in (6a)
aims at encouraging, economically, an agent n to reach power
consensus with its partners. Global stopping criteria associated
to (6) are such as∑
n∈Ω r
k+1
n 6 pri
2
and
∑
n∈Ω s
k+1
n 6 dual
2
(7)
with, respectively, primal and dual local residuals
rk+1n =
∑
m∈ωn
(
pk+1nm + p
k+1
mn
)2
(8a)
sk+1n =
∑
m∈ωn
(
pk+1nm − pknm
)2
. (8b)
Parameters pri and dual denotes primal and dual global
feasibility tolerances, respectively.
The overall negotiation mechanism occurs as follows. Each
market participant first solves its own local optimization (6a).
Once updated, each agent n individually sends its trade
proposals (pk+1nm )m∈ω to each partner m ∈ ωn. After receiving
all counter proposals (pk+1mn )m∈ω , agent n can compute its
new trade prices (λk+1nm )m∈ω with (6b), and local residuals
(rn, sn)
k+1 with (8). Finally, each agent n broadcasts its local
residuals to all and, when all local residuals (ri, si)k+1i∈Ω\{n} are
received, tests global stopping criteria (7). This process is re-
peated until convergence. Being decentralized the negotiation
mechanism is not supported by a central entity. However, as
most information exchanges, a communication standard needs
to be defined by an institutional organization to associate a
communication protocol between peers participating in the
market.
This type of decentralized negotiation mechanism is be-
lieved to require solely local characteristics. However, a deeper
analysis based on inverse problem theory [24] should be
conducted to verify that exchanges of power proposals does
not jeopardize this privacy. As illustrated in [25]–[27], privacy
issues go beyond than the sole topic of multi-bilateral trades
but also affect smart grids in general. Interestingly, the pro-
posed negotiation mechanism limits the amount of transmitted
information as agents only send their trade proposal to their
direct partners and their local residuals. In this context it would
be interesting to use a secured mechanism, as does [15] for
prices updates. In addition, game theory studies on bounded
rationality, as in [28], [29], still hold but might need some
adaptations.
III. EXOGENOUS OPERATION COST ALLOCATION
When the goal is to obtain a P2P market with allocation of
grid-related costs it is possible to use network charges as in
(4). Contrary to preference prices chosen by agents, parameters
γnm are provided by the system operator a priori when used
as network charges. As mentioned in Section I, remember that,
in this paper, a cost allocation policy refers to the way costs
are divided between P2P market participants. The proposed
cost allocation policies will define how network charges are
estimated. They will eventually be pondered by a coefficient
named unit fee to allow a level of slackness for the system
operator to reach cost recovery. Another objective of network
charges may be to reduce congestion risks. In other words, it
should allow the system operator to incite agents to behave
in a beneficial way for the power system. This property is
important because the outcome of (5) does not necessarily
satisfy network constraints (1h)–(1i), as shown later in Section
IV.
Finally, when an incident occurs on the electric network
security dispositions are automated. However, the market
as defined initially is not intrinsically considering this de-
teriorated mode. Partnership sets ωn could be dynamically
adapted in case of congestion. But this would require to
duplicate the number of signals sent by the system operator
to market participants. In addition, participants would have
to manage different routines. A simpler way to influence
agents is to apply new unit fees. That way network charges
offer an indirect mechanism to handle deteriorated modes.
Thus, network charges can push agents to shift from their
usual partners to others unaffected by the malfunctions while
keeping the same routine. At the limit, this operating mode
of cost allocation policies enables market islanding. This
corresponds to a security market procedure with the least grid
stress while waiting for repairment.
After explicitly expressing the amount of money collected
by the system operator, three cost allocation policies are
proposed.
A. Total Fees
The money paid (resp. received) by agent n for buying
from (resp. selling to) agent m is given by the perceived price
µn = λnm−γnm, as shown in Appendix A. Network charges
represent exogenous costs. Thus, when agent n consumes its
γnm are negative which leads to perceived prices µn higher
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(a) Illustrative test system (j2 = −1) (b) Lines’ Thevenin impedance (c) Power transfer distribution factor example
Fig. 1: Illustrative test system for electrical distance estimations (normalized impedances)
than trading prices λnm. When generating perceived prices
are lower than trading prices since parameters γnm would be
positive. The total money paid or received by agent n, for real
power bilateral trades per time unit, is expressed by
Λn =
∑
m∈ωn
λnmpnm−
(
γ0n +
∑
m∈ωn
γnmpnm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Γn
, n ∈ Ω
(9)
where Γn is the part reserved to the system operator.
From the system operator’s point of view, the total amount
of money collected through network charges is simply given
by ΓSO =
∑
n∈Ω Γn. As mentioned previously, note that
the focus is put only on real power trades fees and not
reactive power injection’s. This money can be used to cover
operation expenses – such as maintenance, power losses,
power injection compensations, etc. – as well as investment
cost when considering multiple time steps.
B. Unique Cost Allocation Policy
The way to allocate costs is to share them equally between
community members. At the image of Paris’ one-way trip
public transportation ticket, no discrimination is made between
trades. Because of the universality of this policy, agents in
recurrently congested areas might not be spurred to behave
in a responsible manner. Misbehavior of a few agents may
penalize the rest of the community. If network charges are
such that both ends of a trade are equally responsible, they
can be written as
γuniqnm = ±
uuniq
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (10)
where the sign of γuniqnm is such that γ
uniq
nmpnm > 0, so > 0
for producers and 6 0 for consumers. Unique unit fee uuniq is
expressed in e/MWh in the case of an hourly time unit.
C. Electrical Distance Cost Allocation Policy
To be more precise in how costs are allocated it is possible
to use network charges proportional to the electrical distance
between agents. As for cab travels, this cost allocation policy
would incite agents to trade with their closest electrical part-
ners. Such policy would reflect that long electric distances
are costlier to operate due to power losses for example.
However, power losses can not directly be considered as they
are quadratic, which can not be superposed. When both ends
of a trade equally share responsibility and the previous sign
convention is followed, network charges become
γdistnm = ±
udistdnm
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (11)
where dnm is the electrical distance between agent n and agent
m. Distance unit fee udist is expressed in e/MWh/distance unit
if the same time unit is used.
The definition of an electrical distance is a crucial issue
for this cost allocation policy. [30] recommends two electrical
distances, initially developed to allow a better vulnerability
assessment through topological visualization of an electrical
structure. It is possible to either consider
1) the Thevenin Impedance Distance, where each line is
weighed by the norm of its Thevenin impedance after
which a shortest path algorithm is performed to obtain
the Thevenin electrical distance between two distant
nodes, or
2) the Power Transfer Distance, where the absolute value
of Power Transfer Distribution Factors induced by a
unitary trade are summed.
Thevenin electrical distance Z thil between two connected
nodes is evaluated by
Z thil = | Zii + Zll − Zil − Zli | (12)
where Zil = 1/Yil is an element of bus and branch impedance
matrix. If applied to the small example of Figure 1a, Thevenin
impedances are as in Figure 1b. It is evident that multiple roads
are possible for the power to flow between two nodes. But,
e.g., for a power injection at node 1 and a withdrawal at node
3 only one Thevenin impedance distance value must prevail.
It is proposed to use the shortest path as a metric to reflect
the path on which the power exchange as the highest effect.
For example, shortest path algorithm of [31] can be used. In
the case of Figure 1b, Thevenin impedance distance between
node 1 and node 3 is dth13 = min(Z
th
12 + Z
th
23, Z
th
13) = 0.96.
On the other hand, the power transfer distance between
distant nodes is evaluated by
dPTil =
∑
(r,o)∈L | P
B
il,ro | (13)
where PBil,ro is the power transfer distribution factor, in the
sense of [32], of the branch from node r to node o for an
injection at node i and a withdrawal at node l. Power transfer
distribution factors of Figure 1a for injection at node 1 and
withdrawal at node 3 are given in Figure 1c. The resulting
power transfer distance is dPT13 = 0.63 + 0.63 + 0.37 = 1.63.
So the two approaches do not lead towards identical distance
estimations. The Thevenin impedance distance, considering
the shortest path, is more adapted to radial networks such as
distribution grids. While the power transfer distance, consider-
ing a DC power flow approximation of the entire network, is
better suited for meshed networks such as transmission grids.
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In consequence, the choice of electrical distance type has a
strong impact on the efficiency of the electrical distance cost
allocation policy.
D. Uniform Zonal Cost Allocation Policy
While the unique cost allocation policy does not differenti-
ate agents, the electrical distance one might individualize too
much grid tariffs. At the image of Danish public transportation
system, using a zonal cost allocation policy seems a good com-
promise between both. In this situation the electrical network
would be divided in several zones associated to distinct zonal
unit fees. Each zone could be managed by a different system
operator. A zone with a high price would incite outside agents
not to trade with agents within, and push within agents towards
self-consumption. In this sense, the zonal cost allocation policy
allows to economically isolate an area. However, its efficiency
strongly depends on zones’ design.
A possible way to obtain the network charges is to sum
zonal network fees of zones crossed by each trade. As
mentioned previously, the electrical path is not unique which
could lead to multiple lists of crossed zones. To select only
one of them, the shortest electrical path criterion, as defined
above with the Thevenin electrical distance, can be taken. then,
chosen crossed zones would reflect the most stressed one by a
trade. For illustrative simplicity, in this paper the mechanism
is simplified by considering a uniform zonal unit fee. This
way, the problem of how zonal unit fees are designed between
zones is limited. When costs are equally shared on both ends
of a trade and the sign convention is conserved, uniform zonal
network charges become
γzonenm = ±
uzoneNzonenm
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (14)
where Nzonenm corresponds to the number of crossed zone for
trade pnm. Zonal unit fee uzone is expressed in e/MWh.
Both electrical distance and zonal cost allocation policies
depend on grid characteristics, supposed time independent.
Their unit fees can be adapted to grid’s status (e.g. between
day and night). As any exogenous approach the proposed allo-
cation policies may not ensure efficiency of the P2P market, as
pointed in [16] in the case of transmission rights. Even though
local marginal prices seem effective, they may be largely
rejected for their opacity by P2P market participants anxious
for transparency. To define the unit fees, as well as zones, the
system operator can periodically, e.g. yearly, update unit fees
based on the revenue adequacy and the congestion occurrence
rate of the last period. This type of historical data analysis
is a common practice. For example the French transmission
operator, RTE, publishes1 its transmission tariffs (or TURPE
for Tarif d’Utilisation du Rseau Public d’Electricit) based on
this type of analysis. More details on this method can be
found in the “Study on tariff design for distribution systems”2
prepared for the European Commission. Alternatively, zones
can follow administrative delimitation such as states. Note that
1https://clients.rte-france.com/lang/an/clients producteurs/services clients/
tarif.jsp
2https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20150313%
20Tariff%20report%20fina revREF-E.PDF
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Fig. 2: New England test case for joint P2P market and OPF
other allocation policies have recently been proposed such as
in [33].
IV. CASE-STUDIES AND APPLICATION RESULTS
This section evaluates the effects induced by the proposed
cost allocation policies and compares them to a market free
of network charges.
A. Test Case
To evaluate market responses flexible agents need to be
defined. In addition, grid characteristics are needed to test fea-
sibility of power commitments. Some test cases exist for P2P
markets, such as in [9], but they do not provide power system’s
characteristics. Many standards exist for OPF problems on
transmission and distribution networks. However, they do not
involve flexible loads similar to flexible generation. Following
the notion of organized prosumer group model, proposed in
[3], the focus can be put on transmission systems such as the
IEEE 39-bus test system.
Hence, there is a need for a novel test case adapted to study
P2P markets accounting for network constraints. The IEEE 39-
bus test system is adapted to include flexible loads. Generators
will keep their power boundaries. A wide flexibility range is
given to consumers, with bounds from 10% to 150% of IEEE
test system’s fixed loads. The test case uses quadratic cost
functions written as follows
fn(pn) =
1
2
anp
2
n + bnpn. (15)
Parameters an and bn, inspired from [9], are summarized in
Table I. The final power system in Fig. 2 will be referred
as the New England test case. The network is divided in
four administrative zones close to the following states: Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire and Massachusetts. Not affecting
market outcomes, constant terms γ0n are set to zero.
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Cost allocation policies will, for example, exert differently
on the trade between node 16’s consumer and node 39’s
producer. Since this test case is based on a meshed network
the power transfer distance is used. Note that in such case unit
fee udist is expressed in e/MWh. The power transfer electrical
distance between node 16 and 39 is 7.3, without dimension.
While Thevenin impedance distance’s path, passing by nodes
{16, 17, 18, 3, 2, 1, 39}, crosses two zones. This gives a
ratio 7.3 between the electrical distance and uniform network
charges, and a ratio of 2 in the case of zonal network charges.
B. Free Market
Free market refers to the P2P market without network
charges. In the New England test case, the free market leads
to an electricity price of 57.2 e/MWh which is uniform as
proven in Appendix A. Iterative process (6) converges in
9.5 seconds in MATLAB to primal and dual residuals below
10−4 when ρ = 1. Independently from the power network, it
is important to study interactions between participants. This
aspect will allow to verify if the conjectures made, when cost
allocation policies have been defined, are correct. Looking
at how trades are distributed between participants and the
exchanges between zones seem also relevant. Moreover, grid
usage can be studied in a second step to point the presence of
potential congestion.
To visualize the bilateral trades it is possible to look
into graph theory visualizations such as interaction diagrams.
However, their interpretation in the case of multiple bilateral
trades might be complex. A more intuitive visualization is to
show the trades on power system’s map Fig. 2. For clarity
reasons lines and buses will not be represented. To emphasize
the difference between intra- and inter-zone exchanges, they
will respectively be represented by green and red lines. To
discriminate between main and small trades lines thickness
will be proportional to the power traded. Finally, only trades
over 10−2 MW are represented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3a shows free market power exchanges between par-
ticipants. Agents almost equally trade with all their partners.
This results in many inter-zone exchanges which implies no
correlation between market and power system. In other words,
agents do not favor local trades. As a consequence a high
amount of power flows between zones. The global absolute
exchanges between zones is above 2 GW. However, a DC
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(a) Power trades free of network charges
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(b) Power trades for a unique unit fee uuniq of 10 e/MWh
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(c) Power trades for a distance unit fee udist of 10 e/MWh
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(d) Power trades for a uniform zonal unit fee uzone of 10 e/MWh
Fig. 3: Cost allocation policies’ influence on trades (red lines: inter-zone exchanges, green lines: intra-zone exchanges)
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(a) Total amount of power traded on the market (b) Total amount of power exchanged between zones
Fig. 4: Sensitivities of power exchanges to unit fees (17.5%≡10e/MWh)
TABLE I: Agents’ characteristics of New England test case
Agent Bus an [e/MW2] bn [e/MW] Pn [MW] Pn [MW]
1 1 0.067 64 -146.4 0
2 3 0.047 79 -483 0
3 4 0.047 71 -750 0
4 7 0.053 62 -350.7 0
5 8 0.082 65 -783 0
6 9 0.052 83 -9.8 0
7 12 0.087 63 -12.8 0
8 15 0.057 81 -480 0
9 16 0.050 73 -493.5 0
10 18 0.052 69 -237 0
11 20 0.071 62 -1020 0
12 21 0.064 79 -411 0
13 23 0.057 60 -371.3 0
14 24 0.082 80 -462.9 0
15 25 0.069 78 -336 0
16 26 0.069 70 -208.5 0
17 27 0.086 62 -421.5 0
18 28 0.054 70 -309 0
19 29 0.078 66 -425.3 0
20 31 0.081 70 -13.8 0
21 39 0.059 71 -1656 0
22 30 0.089 18 0 1040
23 31 0.067 21 0 646
24 32 0.055 37 0 725
25 33 0.082 25 0 652
26 34 0.088 17 0 508
27 35 0.076 38 0 687
28 36 0.084 28 0 580
29 37 0.077 36 0 564
30 38 0.051 38 0 865
31 39 0.087 19 0 1100
power flow analysis shows only one congested line located
between node 16 and node 19, used up to 130% of its capacity.
Hence the risk of congestion does not necessarily originate
from exchanges between zones. Of course these quantitative,
numerical results strongly depend on agents’ characteristics.
C. Impact on Peers’ Interactions
Free market results above manifest that no link exists be-
tween market operations and grid’s infrastructure. Understand-
ably, feasibility of market outcomes is not guaranteed. Even
though commitments were applicable, the system operator
would not be able to allocate operation costs without using
network charges. The proposed cost allocation policies have a
direct impact on relationships between community members
and the increase of unit fees might incite agents to trade less
or differently.
By definition the unique cost allocation policy does not
discriminate trades. So, as shown in Fig. 3b, strong interactions
between zones persist even with a unique unit fee of 10
e/MWh, which is equivalent to 17.5% of the free market
electricity price. This policy does not encouraged agents to
reach a dispatch coherent with the power system. However,
the level of trades and the number of relevant trades sufferer
from a small decrease. However the possibility to impact the
grid power flow thank to a market fee is a general property.
On the other hand, with the electrical distance cost allo-
cation policy, and the same value of unit fee, the number
of relevant trades has plummeted, Fig. 3c. Strongest agents
appear to privilege single partnerships with each other while
others are left with many small, negligible trades, so below the
threshold. This reflects that market participants are restrained
to a lower level of flexibility than previously, analysis deepen
in Section IV-D. Power interactions now appear to be grouped
by area making it more coherent with the network. Note that
this assertion is not strict as two inter-zone trades remain
relevant.
Finally, with the zonal cost allocation policy similar inter-
actions can be reached with the same value of unit fee, Fig.
3d. The pressure does not reach the same level of constraint
on market’s flexibility since more power is traded than in Fig.
3c. In this case agents seem restrained to a small number of
partnerships, instead of only one. Note that here no inter-zone
trade continue to exist.
The sensitivities of power exchanges to unit fee variations,
overall on the market and between zones, are presented in
Fig. 4. Inspection of Fig. 4a reveals that the network charges
actually decreases overall the traded volumes on the market
which, as it will be detailed in Section IV-D, lowers the
stress on the transmission network. Fig. 4a also shows that
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Fig. 5: Line rates of power trades with unique network charges
(17.5%≡10e/MWh)
agents chose to opt-out of the market when unique and zonal
network charges are too high. The electrical distance policy
does not steer trades between partners connected to the same
electrical node. Hence, agents 21 and 31, both connected to
bus 39, continue to trade with each other even in presence of
high distance unit fees. As expected, Fig. 4b shows that both
electrical distance and zonal unit fees allow to annihilate all
power exchanges between zones. This perfectly illustrate that,
contrary to the unique cost allocation, electrical distance and
zonal cost allocations enable to isolate zones economically.
D. Effects on Power Network Usage
Despite these results, market aggregation by zone does not
reflect how the electrical grid is used. Cost allocation policies
provides a tool for the system operator to affect the economic
dispatch. Unit fees enable to tweak the expected outcomes of
the P2P market in such way that line capacities might not be
violated. They also offer to the system operator the chance to
look for cost recovery.
Looking at power flows induced by power commitments
is more relevant to evaluate the efficiency of cost allocation
policies. The market does not follow any physical limitations
unlike the electrical grid. Thus, the difference between a
feasible and a none feasible market equilibrium lies in power
network’s feasibility set. In Fig. 5 DC power flows are repre-
sented for various unique unit fees by steps of 1 e/MWh. For
the given market community, in average, lines are used way
below their capacity. As expected when the unit fee increases,
lines usage decreases. However, one line risks congestion but a
sufficient increase of unit fee allows its flow rate to fall below
its capacity. More generally, the absolute disparity of line rates
drops until market’s flexibility is lost.
To compare the three cost allocation policies only the
average (continuous) and the maximum (dash-dotted) line rates
are plotted in Fig. 6 (upper part). It can easily be seen that
electrical distance cost allocation policy behaves differently
from the other two. As an indication, a zone corresponding to
the possible range of the average line rate is shown. The lower
Fig. 6: Effects of unit fees on line rates (upper part) and
total money collected by the system operator (lower part)
(17.5%≡10e/MWh)
and upper bounds are respectively defined as the average line
rate for the global minimum and maximum consumption.
Both maximum and average line rates decrease linearly with
for unique and zonal network charges. Their behavior is linear
as they are defined uniformly or uniformly over zones. As
noted in Section IV-B the most stressed line is within a zone.
In consequence, the zonal cost allocation policy is not able
to remedy the congestion in a better way than the unique
cost allocation policy as zones are not defined properly. The
electrical distance cost allocation policy generates a greater
impact on the market which is translated in a faster decrease
not only on the average but also on the maximum line rate.
This allows to obtain feasibility of market commitments with
a lower over-cost for market participants. However, the money
collected by the system operator might not be sufficient in this
case to reach cost recovery.
The lower part of Fig. 6 represents the total amount of
money collected by the system operator. From these curves it is
clearly possible to identify when the market is too constrained,
so when network charges are too high. In this configuration,
agents choose to opt-out which leads to an absence of collected
money. As a consequence it can be observed that a maximum
exists, dashed lines for the unique cost allocation policy. Then,
the system operator can deduce if operation costs can be
recovered for a given cost allocation policy. Thus, Fig. 6
offers a graphic tool to the system operator. For a given cost
allocation policy this helps choosing the unit fee to provide to
market participants simply by following the proposed guide.
For a given maximum acceptable line rate the corresponding
unit fee and amount of money collected can be deduced. Or,
for a given amount of money to collect the corresponding
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Fig. 7: Exogenous P2P market efficiency (17.5%≡10e/MWh)
unit fee and maximum line rate can be deduced. One can
notice that distance-based network charges seems advisable
when they are low compared to the operational cost while
zonal, or even unique, network charges seems more suited
for network charges larger than the operational cost. A more
advance study would be required to determine whether this
observation is related to the test case or intrinsic to network
charges’ design.
The proposed network charges affect bilateral trades in a
way that may introduce sub-optimalities. As shown in Fig.
7, considering network charges, when feasible, deteriorates
clearing’s optimality compared to the free market without
network limitations. Distance-based network charges rapidly
degrades the social welfare since low unit fees suffice to
impact market outcomes, as observed in Fig. 4b and 6.
Remember that the proposed network charges encompass
more than just congestion-related costs. Hence, exogenous P2P
market (5) can neither be compared to the endogenous P2P
economic dispatch (1) nor to [16]. If network charges were
including only congestion-related costs, one with complete
prior knowledge of the market could choose them optimally
as in Appendix A. Since no distributed solution approach
exists, (1) is handled with a centralized interior-point solver. In
comparison to the classical economic dispatch, the proposed
method based on network charges brings transparency and is
simple to implement in P2P markets. However, this may be
done at the cost of technical and economical drawbacks as
respectively pointed in Fig. 6 and 7. This result reinforces
the interest of developing a distributed approach solving (1)
similarly to [5], which would require more involvement from
the system operator.
V. CONCLUSION
Peer-to-peer markets are considered as a likely evolution
of the power systems driven by distributed energy resources
and ICT development. In this paper a peer-to-peer electricity
market including network charges has been considered. Net-
work charges, provided a priori, have been used as incentives
to account for grid-related costs in a simple and transparent
way. This mechanism incites market participants to respect
power system’s limits, rather than enforcing them. Tested for
three incentive frameworks, on a novel test case based on the
IEEE 39-bus test system, it has been shown the ability of this
mechanism to limit the stress put on the physical grid by the
market. Network charges also allow the system operator to
collect money from market participants for their use of the
grid in the aim of reaching cost recovery. On the down side,
the approach may lead to inefficient or unfeasible solutions
when network charges are not chosen wisely.
This exogenous approach is a candidate for a future im-
plementation of peer-to-peer markets with low involvement of
the system operator. In addition, the development of network
charges adapted to distribution networks, so considering reac-
tive powers, would provide a more generic exogenous peer-to-
peer market. As any consumer-centric system, it is essential
to study the privacy and the security of market participants
as well as the stability of the proposed design. In particular
the presence of agents who could have the ability to be self
sufficient represent a risk of snowballing effect. For each agent
opting out, remaining agents would suffer from higher charges
due to a redistribution between less participants. Finally, the
resilience of the system to non-rational or strategic agents must
be examined before a real world implementation.
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APPENDIX
A. Comparison With The Pool-based Market And The Endoge-
nous Economic Dispatch
The Lagrangian of the real power market part of (5)
Lρ(P,W,Λ,µ) =
∑
n∈Ω Ln,ρ(Pn,W,Λn, µn) (16)
with W = (wnm)n,m, Λ = (λnm)n,m and µ = (µn)n∈Ω.
Local augmented objectives can be written as
Ln,ρ(Pn,W,Λn, µn) = f˜n (pn)+µn
(∑
m∈ωn
pnm − pn
)
+ γ0n +
∑
m∈ωn
[
γnmpnm + λnm ((wnm − wmn)/2− pnm)
+ (ρ/2) ((wnm − wmn)/2− pnm)2
]
(17)
where ρ > 0 is the penalty factor, Pn = (pnm)m∈ωn and
Λn = (λnm)m∈ωn . Function f˜n is the extended-value of fn,
in the sense of [11], with a domain defined by (5c)–(5g).
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) stationarity conditions of (16)–
(17) allows to obtain equalities
µn =
{
∂f˜n
∂pn
λnm − γnm m ∈ ωn
, n ∈ Ω (18)
Note that the perceived price µn, which is the dual variable
of constraint (5c), links agent n’s energy cost ∂f˜n∂pn to trading
prices (λnm)m∈ωn and network charges (γnm)m∈ωn .
KKT optimality conditions of (1) can be written
µn =
{
∂f˜n
∂pn
λnm − ηi∈Ωn m ∈ ωn
, n ∈ Ω (19)
where ηi∈Ωn denotes the dual variable of nodal balance
constraint (1i) associated to the node i on which agent n
is connected. If one had complete prior knowledge of the
market, they could solve the endogenous P2P economic dis-
patch (1) and deduce the optimal nodal energy prices, namely
γnm = ηi∈Ωn . However, in doing so they would only be able
to recover their costs of congestion but neither taxes nor other
operation costs as proposed in this paper.
In a pool market, consensus constraint (5b) is replaced by
power balance constraint
∑
n∈Ω pn = 0 and constraints (5c)–
(5g) are non-existent. Hence, KKT stationarity conditions of
the pool market read
∂f˜n
∂pn
+ λPM = 0 (20)
where dual variable λPM of the power balance constraint
represents the pool market energy price. As both (5) and
the pool market would be made of the same agents, one
could readily notice that (5) without network charges, so with
(γnm)n,m = 0, leads to a uniform trading price equal to the
pool market price λPM.
B. Decentralized P2P Market ADMM
ADMM of (5) consists in iterations
{P,µ}k+1 = argmin
P,µ
Lρ(P,Wk,Λk,µ) (21a)
Wk+1 = argmin
W
Lρ(Pk+1,W,Λk) (21b)
Λk+1 = Λk + ρ
((
Wk+1 −Wk+1,T) /2− Pk+1)
(21c)
Looking at the Lagrangian formulation (16)–(17), step (21a)
can be distributed among agents such as
{Pn, µn}k+1 = argmin
Pn,µn
Ln,ρ(Pn,WK ,Λkn, µn) (22)
As in [11] update (21b) can be written
Wk+1 =
(
Pk+1 − Pk+1,T) /2− (Λk+1 −Λk+1,T) /(2ρ)
(23)
Substituting (23) in (21c) gives Λk+1−Λk+1,T = 0. So, after
the first iteration Wk+1 =
(
Pk+1 − Pk+1,T) /2. Overall, after
simplifications, the decentralized negotiation mechanism reads
as (6).
